Six invitations in Johannesburg: what a larger BRICS means for Europe

The fifteenth BRICS summit closed in Sandton on 24 August with a decision that the group had discussed for a year. Paragraph 91 of the Johannesburg II Declaration invites the Argentine Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates "to become full members of BRICS from 1 January 2024"[1]. President Ramaphosa said that the five leaders had reached consensus on "the first phase of this expansion process"[2]. President Lula said that BRICS would continue to be open to new members[2]. The group was formed by Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2009 and admitted South Africa in 2010[3]. It has not admitted anyone since. The decision therefore deserves a sober reading, from a European think tank, of what it changes and what it does not.

What the Declaration decides

The membership paragraph is the operative part of a long text. The Declaration also supports "a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council" and backs the aspirations of Brazil, India and South Africa to a greater role there[1]. On currencies, paragraph 45 tasks the finance ministers and central bank governors to examine local currencies, payment instruments and platforms and to report back at the next summit[1]. On Ukraine, paragraph 19 recalls the national positions of the members "as expressed at the appropriate fora" and welcomes mediation proposals, including the African Leaders Peace Mission[1]. The New Development Bank has a new president, Dilma Rousseff, and three new shareholders, Bangladesh, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates[1].

The arithmetic of the enlargement is uneven. The present five members hold about 40% of the world's population and about a quarter of global GDP[4]. The six invited States add weight in energy more than in output. On IEA estimates, the present members produce about 21% of the world's oil and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran would add a further 20%[6]. Three of the six invited States already coordinate production with Russia inside OPEC+[6]. The enlargement therefore brings together, in one forum, the largest exporters of crude and two of its largest importers, China and India.

What the Declaration leaves open

Three questions remain unanswered in the text. The first is the criteria. More than forty States expressed interest and twenty-three applied formally, among them Algeria, Indonesia, Cuba and Venezuela[12]. The Declaration says that the members agreed on guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures, yet it does not publish them[3]. The public cannot know why Ethiopia was chosen and Algeria was not. The second question is the currency. Mr Putin told the summit, by video from Moscow, that de-dollarisation is "an irreversible process" and that the dollar's share of trade among the members fell to 28.7% last year [7, 8]. The business forum debated a common BRICS currency and, in the words of the Standard Bank chief executive, reached little consensus[7]. The Declaration contains no common currency. It contains a study. The third question is whether the invitations will be accepted. President Fernández called the invitation "a great opportunity" for Argentina[9]. The two main opposition candidates for the election of 22 October said the opposite. Mr Milei said he would not promote a deal with Communists and Ms Bullrich said that under her government the country would not be in BRICS[10]. Saudi Arabia welcomed the invitation and said it would review the details before taking a decision[5]. Iran's presidential adviser called the admission a strategic success[5]. One member in waiting is enthusiastic, one is hesitant and one may be withdrawn by its own voters.

Mr Putin attended by video. He is the subject of an arrest warrant of the International Criminal Court, and South Africa is a State Party to the Rome Statute[8]. The Declaration's paragraph on Ukraine, which merely recalls national positions, shows the limit of the group's cohesion on the question that matters most to Europeans. The members hold different national positions on the war, and the text records that difference without resolving it[1].

What Europeans of our generation should take from it

Our generation was born into a world in which the G7 set the agenda. The Johannesburg decision does not end that world, yet it shows that a competing forum can attract more applicants than it admits. The European Union has no equivalent waiting list. France tried to be present: President Macron conveyed through his foreign minister his wish to attend the summit, and Russia said that the attendance of a NATO member would be inappropriate[11]. No invitation came. Europe has no reason to seek a seat at BRICS. It has every reason to notice that the States which applied are asking for things the Union could offer and often does not: predictable finance, a voice in institutions and trade without conditions they consider political.

We make four recommendations. First, the Union should answer the Declaration's call for Security Council reform with a position of its own, since Article 34(2) of the Treaty on European Union already requires Member States that sit on the Council to defend the positions and the interests of the Union there[13]. Second, the Commission should accelerate Global Gateway disbursements in the States that applied to BRICS and were not admitted, because those States have shown that they will accept offers from any direction. Third, the Member States should maintain the Union's sanctions on Iran and its support for the International Criminal Court without exception, and say so to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo, with whom the Union keeps close relations. Fourth, the European External Action Service should publish, before 1 January 2024, an assessment of what the enlargement changes for energy security, since nearly 41% of world oil production will then sit inside one political forum[6].