What the new Afghanistan means for its neighbours: regional geopolitical impacts of the Taliban takeover

In the aftermath of 20 years of US military intervention, Afghanistan has once again fallen to the Taliban. Despite the announced withdrawal of US forces, the almost immediate collapse of the former Afghan government and the failure of international actors to both secure an orderly exit and protect those that had collaborated with them over the last two decades serves as a testament to the chaotic end of America's nation-building project in Afghanistan. This hasty exit has also signaled the abandonment of Afghan nationals in the face of the repressive governance and human rights abuses that will follow the Taliban rise to power – some of which, including the massacre of ethnic minorities, the banning of women from high-public offices and educational institutions, and the reestablishment of public executions, are already underway.

However, while the international community continues to ponder its failures and evaluates potential responses to the new Taliban government, neighboring nations have been strategically preparing to manage the security consequences that will inevitably follow this change in government.

The old Afghanistan once again: new security challenges

The impact of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will – very literally – not remain within its borders. Its regional neighbors, which had been to some degree preparing for the fallout of a US withdrawal since last year, are being forced to contend with both the outpour of refugees attempting to flee the country and the increased likelihood of resurgent and belligerent violent extremism across the region.

The refugee crisis

With tens of thousands of Afghan civilians fleeing Taliban rule – and the potential of over half a million attempting to do so before the end of the year – a severe humanitarian crisis is underway. This crisis results from both the internal displacement and refugee flows, and the compounded effects of a severe drought, the pandemic, and a collapsing Afghan economy. Indeed, Afghanistan is facing an almost complete human security crisis – with the lack of basic political, economic, healthcare, security and food services only exacerbating over time. The UN has reported on the sheer scale of this collapse in terms of displacement, malnutrition, and poverty. According to this data, Afghanistan now has over 570.000 internally displaced people, 14 million – or about one third of the population – lacking sufficient food, another 38 million facing potential food insecurity, and an estimate of 72% of the population living below the poverty line. These conditions have disproportionately affected women and girls – who are suffering targeted attacks, increased levels of domestic and communal violence, and amount to half of all civilian casualties. The uncertainty surrounding the support and level of presence of United Nations agencies and international aid organizations in the country remains, but hope has been renewed in the wake of a recently announced 1-billion-dollar pledge to humanitarian aid in response to the worsening crises and the declaration by the Taliban that they will allow and respect aid operations in the country.

Despite this, one of the mayor points of contention remains the resettlement of Afghan refugees. In fact, reactions from most countries have been restrictive and even sometimes actively hostile. As such, those fleeing are facing little support and an uncertain future. Neighboring states have taken generally cautious positions. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have both indicated a strong pushback against incoming refugees; with the former stating it will aid in the transfer of refugees to third countries, but will only host them temporarily, and that any illegal crossing will be harshly rejected, and the latter adamantly rejecting refugees and rushing military forces to the Afghan border as deterrence. Tajikistan initially offered to accept up to [100.000 refugees](about:blank), but so far has only acted as a transit state, and has also moved troops to the Tajik-Afghan border – stationing 20.000 servicemen at the border, and mobilizing another 100.000 soldiers and 130.000 reserve officers for military exercises close by. On the other hand, states like Iran and Pakistan already host high numbers of Afghan refugees – however, they have taken opposite approaches in the wake of this new wave. Iran has given assurances that it will accept refugees – as best it can – but will prompt their immediate repatriation when conditions improve, and stated that they will be relegated to refugee camps near the border. On the other hand, Pakistan has taken a much more definitive approach, threatening to close the border entirely. With domestic perception of refugees in the state becoming even more unfavorable, even those that manage to cross the border into Pakistan will face scathing conditions. Overall, there is little recourse left for those fleeing the Taliban – and the situation will likely only continue to deteriorate as the number of refugees increases in coming months.

A new rise of violent extremism

Beyond the human cost of the refugee crisis, another great threat to regional security looms in the horizon. The Taliban's widely seen advance towards Kabul will serve to reaffirm and embolden like-minded militant groups across the region. In fact, foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) aligned with violent Islamist movements will likely find a safe haven in Afghanistan from which they can begin to rebuild and strengthen their operations. These groups will seek to secure critical funding, network, and find recruitment opportunities in the Taliban-led Afghanistan – something with broad implications for both regional and global security. Indeed, despite the fact that the Taliban have denied the presence or the lending of support to any foreign terrorist fighters in their territory, a June 2021 UN report has denounced the continued cooperation of the Taliban with groups like al-Qaeda – estimating that anywhere from 8,000 to 10,000 foreign terrorist fighters may remain present within Afghan borders. Additionally, while confrontations between the Taliban and ISIS affiliate groups – like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP or ISIS-K) – might be relayed to the eastern provinces of Afghanistan for now, they are also at risk of spreading and affecting neighboring states. The ambitions of groups like the ISKP, in search of the realization of a pan-Islamist Salafist ideology that seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate across all Central Asia, are a broad regional threat that require an aligned counterterrorism policy.

For now, responses from nearby nations have sought assurances from the Taliban that they will control and combat this rise in extremism – while preparing for this to certainly not be the case.

Tajikistan has become the Taliban's harshest critic in the region, immediately commencing operations to fortify its border and response capabilities. This is mainly due to the threat posed by Tajik FTFs belonging to Jamaat Ansarullah – commonly referred to as the Tajik Taliban – which are designated as a terrorist organization in Tajikistan. There is reason to worry, as the Taliban have put this group in charge of security in five Afghan territories along the Tajik border. Indeed, part of the reason for Tajikistan's immediate mobilization of active and reserve personal has been to prepare for any possible attacks. The Tajik president also called upon its allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for support, strengthening its position along the Afghan-Tajik border. Until now, Tajikistan had for the most part forgone any engagement with the Taliban, and only seems to be hardening this position further; while simultaneously trying to mitigate the risk of increased refugee flows, drug trafficking, and terrorism. This position is still a notable break from most of its regional partners, that have taken a more conciliatory approach to the new Afghan government. However, it is important to remember that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon is the only leader in the region that has been in power for over 20 years – that is, since the last time the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Having dealt with the Taliban in power once before, Tajikistan is preparing for the worst and becoming a firm opposition to the group's ambitions of regional collaboration.

Pakistan, in turn, has a more complex situation to contend with regarding the newly established Taliban government. On one hand, both high-ranking military leaders and the country's intelligence service publicly support the Taliban – having done so since the 1990s. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan echoed this long-standing support as the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, stating they had "broken the shackles of slavery". This resounding support derives partially from the perception that the previous US-backed Afghan government was working with India to launch attacks on Pakistan. While a Taliban-led state effectively neutralizes this threat, it may serve to bring forth a new one. The Pakistani government now has to address the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – that have long sought to overthrow their government to implement a fundamentalist Islamic rule – and are strengthening their numbers and reach from within Afghanistan. While the TPP is undergoing an ideological re-adjustment, the Taliban stand to use the TPP as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Pakistan – which are already underway. As such, While the rise of the Taliban has been a victory for Pakistani interests, it will also require the active contention of new terrorist threats. Already, Pakistan, Russia and China are setting the base for extensive cooperation with Kabul on matters of security and economics – seeking to fill the need for patronage left in the wake of the US withdrawal.

Similarly, Iran also has a double-edged sword to manage regarding the Taliban. While the exit of US forces from the region is undoubtedly seen as a positive development for Khomeini's Iran, the potential rise of terrorist groups like the ISKP and the continuous flow of Afghan narcotics into their border remain severe problems. Iran has taken a mixed approach to the Taliban government – somewhat hostile, but somewhat accommodating. The state is liaising with the Taliban in political talks to monitor the ISKP and ensure it is not in a position to threaten its borders, as well as negotiating mutually-beneficial economic deals. There is a strong historical base for this bilateral cooperation – with Iran having provided support and weapons to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters against US forces. However, a key difference also remains in place – the Shiite Iran has vested concerns in how the Sunni Taliban will respond to Shiite minority groups in Afghanistan. Given the already occurring public and brutal executions of Hazara men in the Ghazni province and the murders of Iranian diplomatic personnel, this will likely continue to be a point of tension and stands to be a prime friction point in future Iran-Afghanistan relations.

India faces maybe the least favorable scenario – having strongly supported the previous Afghan government and sharing important ties with the US. The fallout from the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will force India to contend with an emboldened AQIS – the denomination of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. This group will attempt to increase its presence in Kashmir, where the exacerbation of the conflict in the wake of India revoking the territory's autonomy statute has led to rising tensions and a protracted human security crises. While the official position of the Indian government has been that of non-negotiation with terrorist groups, it will engage with the Taliban to secure common economic and security interests. Whether these will succeed is unclear, especially considering Afghan cooperation prospects with Pakistan, their position on Kashmir, and increasing Chinese influence in the state.

Other Central Asian states, namely Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, have been taking a conciliatory and accommodating stance towards the Taliban government – primarily to secure vital economic partnerships and maintain safe borders. Uzbekistan had been holding talks with both the former Afghan government and the Taliban – attempting to ensure that however the situation evolved, they would maintain a favorable position in Afghanistan. Indeed, Uzbekistan has affirmed it seeks to act as a neutral party – neither anti-Taliban nor pro-Western. The Uzbek President has sought to ensure the maintenance long-standing economic cooperation and of favorable trade routes across Afghanistan – a key nexus point for commerce with the wider South-Central Asia economic zone and Europe. Similarly, Turkmenistan had also been playing both sides, in line with its policy of permanent neutrality. The state is in a position to secure favorable relations with the Taliban, and has offered medical and humanitarian assistance to Afghans. The aim is to maintain the continuity of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, which will allow for the transportation of large volumes of natural gas from Turkmenistan towards Pakistan and India across Afghan territory. In this way, the Taliban have secured some local partners that will help facilitate a measure of economic activity. Indeed, the newly formed Taliban government will depend strongly upon cooperation with regional powers to re-build their collapsed economy, secure foreign investment – which they are desperately in need of after the IMF denied them access to 450 million dollars in credit – and gain international legitimacy.

After the war: perspectives of future regional security

Both regional and international actors have a responsibility to pressure the newly-formed Taliban government into abiding by, at the very least, basic principles of good governance and human rights. However, there is little prospect that this will be the case. Indeed, regional states have been favoring permissive engagements with the Taliban to both contain the security threat of refugee flows and rising terrorist groups, and to secure core geopolitical or economic interests.

For Afghan refugees, asylum options in the region will remain dire and limited. With the expectant resurgence of jihadi groups serving to complicate the security situation even further, we can predict worsening limitations on the entry of Afghan citizens into neighboring countries. If terror attacks become more frequent and deadly, pushback will emerge from these countries towards Afghan nationals and the Taliban's protection of likeminded groups. There is also likely to be infighting between different terrorist groups, which will have a detrimental effect human security both within Afghanistan and in foreign provinces close to the Afghan border.

Going forward, the Taliban will find both measured resistance and conditional support, but little real challenge to their de-facto government. Regional governments will not engage in active opposition, but will also not provide extensive help. With a set board of local powers, those fleeing from the Taliban may look further abroad for support – but whether they will find any is another matter entirely.