Finland joins NATO: what the 31st Ally changes for Europeans born after neutrality

On Tuesday 4 April 2023 the Finnish Foreign Minister, Pekka Haavisto, handed Finland's instrument of accession to the United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The United States is the depositary of the North Atlantic Treaty. With that deposit, Finland became the Alliance's 31st Ally. The Finnish flag was raised outside the headquarters for the first time, and the same ceremony took place at Allied Command Operations in Mons and at Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk[1]. President Sauli Niinistö said that "the era of military non-alignment in our history has come to an end"[2].

Our generation grew up with a Finland that stayed outside military alliances by choice. That choice has been reversed in less than fourteen months, and the speed matters as much as the result.

Eleven months from application to accession

Finland and Sweden handed their applications to the Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, on 18 May 2022. Their ambassadors delivered the letters together, and Stoltenberg called it "a good day, at a critical moment for our security"[3]. The Allies signed Finland's Accession Protocol on 5 July 2022, and all 30 national parliaments then had to ratify it[1].

The domestic side went quickly. The Eduskunta approved membership on 1 March 2023 by 184 votes to 7 in a chamber of 200 seats[4]. Public opinion had moved before the politicians did. A Yle poll published on 9 May 2022 found 76 per cent of Finns in favour of membership, against 53 per cent in February of the same year, and only 12 per cent opposed[5]. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 explains the shift. The invasion did not create a NATO debate in Finland; it ended one.

The last two ratifications came from the two capitals that had held the process up. The Hungarian parliament voted on 27 March 2023 by 182 votes to 6. Members of the governing Fidesz party said at the same time that they would wait on Sweden until Stockholm had resolved what they called lingering disagreements[6]. The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted on 30 March 2023, and all 276 legislators present supported Finland's bid. Ankara has said that Finland took concrete steps against groups Turkey regards as terrorist organisations and eased restrictions on defence exports. Sweden has received no such approval[7].

What Finland brings, and what Russia says

The Alliance's land border with Russia has more than doubled. Finland's frontier with Russia is about 1,340 kilometres long[8]. Before Tuesday, Russia shared about 1,215 kilometres of land border with five NATO members[9]. Finland's wartime strength is about 280,000 troops, and it can call on about 900,000 reservists trained through conscription[9]. Niinistö told the ceremony that "Finland provides security for the Alliance" and that the largest Finnish contribution to deterrence rests on the defence of its own territory[2].

Moscow's reaction has been measured in words and threatening in substance. The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters on 4 April that the accession "forces us to take countermeasures" and described it as an encroachment on Russia's security interests[10]. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexander Grushko, said that Russia would strengthen its military capabilities in the west and north-west if NATO members deployed forces and equipment in Finland[9]. Niinistö said that Finland's membership "is not targeted against anyone" and that the foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy are unchanged[2].

For the European Union the change is quieter but real. Finland was already covered by the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, which provides that Member States owe each other aid and assistance by all the means in their power in the event of armed aggression, and which states that commitments and cooperation in this area remain consistent with NATO commitments for those Member States which are NATO members[11]. Finland has now moved from the first category to the second. Of the 27 Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden now remain outside the Alliance, and Sweden intends to leave that list.

Sweden's empty chair

Sweden attended the Brussels ceremony as an invitee. Stoltenberg said he looked forward to welcoming Sweden as soon as possible[1]. Niinistö was more direct. He said that "Finland's membership is not complete without that of Sweden" and that he expected Sweden to join as the 32nd member at the Vilnius Summit in July[2]. Turkey and Hungary have not ratified the Swedish protocol. Ankara accuses Stockholm of leniency towards Kurdish groups and has objected to protests in Sweden, including a Quran burning[7]. Budapest has said that it will not act on Sweden before Turkey does[6].

We see two risks in this gap. The first is military. The Nordic defence plans that Helsinki and Stockholm have drawn up assume that both countries sit inside the same alliance. A Finland inside and a Sweden outside leaves the Baltic Sea half covered. The second risk is political. Two Allies have shown that a single capital can hold a candidate hostage to bilateral grievances, and the lesson has been learned in every other capital.

Our generation did not vote for the Cold War settlement that kept Finland non-aligned, and we did not vote for the invasion that ended it. We will live with the consequences of both, and we should say what we want from the next months.

We recommend that the Allies make Sweden's accession the first item of business at Vilnius on 11 and 12 July 2023 and refuse to let the summit close without a date. We recommend that the Council of the European Union state publicly that Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union applies to Sweden in full while its NATO accession is pending, so that no gap in protection exists on paper. We recommend that Finland keep its conscription model intact as it integrates into NATO planning, because a trained reserve of 900,000 is the clearest answer to Russian talk of countermeasures. We recommend that the European Parliament, which will be renewed in 2024, ask the candidates for the Commission presidency how they intend to make the mutual assistance clause operational, because the question of who defends a Member State is no longer theoretical.