Commentary
Trump returns: what the Union must now decide on trade, Ukraine, NATO and climate
Donald Trump will return to the White House in January. The leaders of the Union congratulated him on 6 November, before the count was complete. Ursula von der Leyen said the Union and the United States are "more than just allies" and looked forward to a strong transatlantic agenda. Charles Michel spoke of an enduring alliance and a historic bond. Mark Rutte said he looked forward to working with the new President to advance peace through strength[1]. The words were correct and expected. They do not tell our generation what will change. We were born after 1992 and have known one Trump presidency already. The second one arrives with a written programme, and the Union has had four years to read it.
What the programme says
On trade, the candidate promised a universal tariff of at least 10% on all goods imported into the United States, and has mentioned 20%. He promised 60% on Chinese goods and spoke of 100% on imported cars[2]. The United States took 19.7% of the Union's goods exports in 2023 and was its second supplier of goods, at 13.7%[2]. During the first term the United States imposed 25% on Union steel and 10% on Union aluminium, and the Union answered with duties on Harley-Davidson motorcycles and bourbon. Those tariffs were suspended in 2023, and they were not abolished[3]. The economic estimates vary. The Grantham Institute at the London School of Economics puts the loss at 0.11% of Union GDP, with Germany at 0.23% and France at 0.15%. ABN Amro puts the brake on Union growth at 1.5% over three years, with Germany "especially vulnerable"[2].
On Ukraine, the candidate said he could bring Zelensky and Putin to a settlement "within 24 hours". His running mate, J. D. Vance, has described a demilitarised zone along the present line of contact and a Ukrainian pledge to stay out of NATO[4]. The allies agreed in Washington in July 2024 to keep military support to Ukraine at about €40 billion a year, but diplomats say that commitment binds the incoming President morally and not legally. The Kiel Institute warned in October that total aid would halve if American support stopped[3].
On NATO, Rutte told leaders in Budapest on 7 November that allies would have to spend more and that the figure must be much more than 2% of GDP[5]. Trump has demanded 4%. On climate, the first Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, and the campaign signalled in June 2024 that it would do so again. In his victory speech the President-elect said the United States has "more liquid gold" than any country[6]. The Conference of the Parties opens in Baku on 11 November, and the Union will negotiate a new finance goal with an American delegation whose authority expires in January.
What the Union said in Budapest and what it did not
The European Political Community met in Budapest on 7 November, two days after the vote. Emmanuel Macron asked whether Europe wanted "to write our own history" and said that Europe must not delegate its security to America forever[7]. Von der Leyen said no Member State could manage the coming period alone. Petteri Orpo said of the tariffs that they should not be allowed to happen. Luc Frieden spoke of "unpredictability" and said the Union would not give up its principles. Zelensky said territorial concessions would be "suicide for all Europe"[5].
The summit produced sentences and no instruments. The same evening the German coalition collapsed. Olaf Scholz dismissed his finance minister, Christian Lindner, on 6 November, the Free Democrats left the government and the Chancellor announced a confidence vote by 15 January. Early elections could follow in March. Scholz himself linked the two events and said that settling Germany's security financing was "perhaps more urgent than ever" after the American vote[8]. The largest Member State enters the Trump transition without a majority. France has a government that depends on abstentions. The Commission that will negotiate with Washington has not yet taken office. The Union has a programme to answer and no one fully in charge.
We do not think the answer is alarm. The first Trump term taught three things. The United States used tariffs as an opening position and negotiated afterwards. The allies that raised defence spending obtained a hearing, and those that did not were lectured. The Paris Agreement survived an American withdrawal because the other parties stayed. The second term will test whether those lessons still hold, with a weaker Germany, a larger war and a tighter budget.
What we recommend
The Commission should prepare now, before the inauguration, a list of American products on which the Union would restore the suspended 2018 countermeasures, and publish it, so that the opening position of January is met by a known answer. The Council should decide in December, with the Parliament, how the €40 billion annual commitment to Ukraine would be met from Union and Member State budgets if American funding stopped on 20 January, because a commitment that depends on Washington is not a commitment. Member States should set a dated path to defence spending above 2% of GDP at the NATO summit of 2025, since Rutte has already said the figure must rise and the argument is better made by Europeans than by Trump. The Union delegation at Baku should state on the record that its own finance pledge does not depend on the American one. Our generation will live with the results of these four years longer than any of the leaders who met in Budapest. Speaking is not enough. We ask them to decide.
Noten
Citeren
Global Policy Centre, "Trump returns: what the Union must now decide on trade, Ukraine, NATO and climate", Génération Maastricht, 8 November 2024, https://generationmaastricht.org/research/trump-returns-what-the-union-must-now-decide.
