The Pact on Migration and Asylum passes by thin margins and leaves the hard work to 2026

On Wednesday 10 April 2024, in its penultimate plenary session before the June elections, the European Parliament adopted the ten legislative texts that make up the Pact on Migration and Asylum[1]. The Commission first proposed the package on 23 September 2020, and the Council reached its position on the two central regulations on 8 June 2023[2]. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement on 20 December 2023[3]. The Council must now give its formal approval, and the regulations are expected to apply two years after their entry into force[1]. The vote closes a legislative cycle. It does not close the political argument.

What the ten texts provide

The package has four main pillars. The screening Regulation provides that third-country nationals who do not meet the conditions of entry undergo a pre-entry screening of up to seven days, which includes identification, the collection of biometric data and health and security checks. Each Member State must set up an independent mechanism to monitor fundamental rights during the screening[1]. The reformed Eurodac Regulation adds facial images to fingerprints and provides that data may be collected from children aged six and above[3].

The asylum procedure Regulation creates a common procedure for granting and withdrawing international protection. It generalises the border procedure, which must be completed within 12 weeks, or 20 weeks in a crisis[4]. Applicants are channelled into the border procedure when they are considered a threat to national security, when they have misled the authorities about their identity, or when they come from a country whose recognition rate is below 20 per cent. Unaccompanied minors are excluded from the border procedure unless they pose a security risk. Families with children are not excluded; the text says they should not be prioritised for it and that the Commission may recommend suspending the procedure for families when reception conditions are inadequate[5]. The Council's position of June 2023 set the adequate capacity for border procedures at 30,000 places across the Union[2].

The asylum and migration management Regulation replaces the Dublin Regulation and establishes a mechanism of mandatory solidarity. Member States under migratory pressure receive support from the others, who choose between relocating applicants, making financial contributions or providing operational support[1]. The Council's June 2023 agreement set the minimum annual number of relocations at 30,000 and the financial equivalent of one relocation at EUR 20,000[2]. The Regulation also provides that the Member State of first entry remains responsible for an applicant for two years[2]. The crisis and force majeure Regulation allows temporary derogations from the standard procedures in the event of a sudden mass arrival and extends the rules to the "instrumentalisation" of migrants by a third country or a hostile non-state actor[3].

Why the margins matter

The vote tallies tell a story of their own. The asylum procedure Regulation passed by 301 votes to 269, with 51 abstentions. The crisis Regulation passed by 301 votes to 272, with 46 abstentions. The asylum and migration management Regulation passed by 322 votes to 266, with 31 abstentions[1]. The three core texts therefore passed with majorities of between 29 and 56 votes. The texts on resettlement, reception conditions and Eurodac passed by far wider margins[1].

The opposition came from both ends of the hemicycle. Malin Björk of The Left, rapporteur for the resettlement framework, voted against the package and said that it "undermines the individual right to seek asylum"[6]. Far-right members said the reform did not go far enough in stopping irregular arrivals[6]. National delegations within the Socialists and Democrats split: the Italian Democratic Party opposed most of the files[7]. Protesters in the public gallery interrupted the start of the vote with the chant "This pact kills, vote no"[6].

Civil society is divided on the outcome. A joint statement by 22 organisations, among them the International Rescue Committee and Oxfam, said the Pact has serious flaws and offers no sustainable solution at the borders, while welcoming the resettlement component[6]. Amnesty International said that Europe "has missed a vital opportunity" and warned of a greater risk of pushbacks, arbitrary detention and discriminatory policing[8]. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles argued in June 2023 that the Council's text lowered protection standards and left the Dublin logic of first-entry responsibility largely intact[9]. The Commission welcomed the vote and said it will present a Common EU Implementation Plan with the EU agencies[10].

We note the arithmetic of demand. In 2023, 1,048,900 non-EU citizens applied for asylum in the Union for the first time, a rise of 20 per cent on 2022. Germany, Spain, France and Italy received 73 per cent of those applications. Per head of population, Cyprus received 13 applicants per 1,000 inhabitants, Greece and Austria 6, against an EU average of 2[11]. The Pact's solidarity floor of 30,000 relocations represents under 3 per cent of one year's first-time applications. Its border-procedure capacity of 30,000 places covers a similar share. Both numbers can be raised. The baseline is modest.

What our generation should watch

Our generation grew up with the Dublin Regulation. We will be the officials, lawyers and voters who make these rules work, or watch them fail, from 2026 onwards. The Parliament's vote did not settle whether Member States will staff the border procedures, whether the monitoring mechanisms will have the means to act, or whether the solidarity pledges will be honoured when the first annual cycle begins.

We make four recommendations. First, the Council should adopt the package before the elections, as the co-legislators promised in December 2023, so that the two-year implementation clock starts under this Parliament's mandate[3]. Second, the Commission's implementation plan should set a date and a budget line for each national monitoring mechanism under the screening Regulation, because a mechanism without staff will not detect a pushback. Third, the Parliament's next Civil Liberties Committee should ask the Commission each year for the number of families with children placed in border procedures, since the text leaves them inside the procedure by default[5]. Fourth, Member States should publish their relocation pledges in full and on time, so that citizens can compare what their governments promised with what they deliver.