After Anchorage and Washington, Europe sits at the table it did not set

The Anchorage meeting lasted about three hours and produced no ceasefire[1]. President Trump and President Putin made statements at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and took no questions[1]. President Trump said that "there was no deal until there's a deal" and spoke of headway on most points[1]. President Putin said that the primary roots of the conflict had to be addressed and invited his host to Moscow[1]. No European government took part. The European contribution to the summit consisted of telephone calls placed before it, which Keir Giles of Chatham House reads as proof that European leaders had done little to stay relevant since February[3]. We think that reading is harsh. We also think it is largely correct.

What Europe asked for on 16 August

The morning after Anchorage, eight European leaders, including the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission, published a joint statement after President Trump's debrief[2]. The statement sets out the European position in five sentences that deserve to be read as a negotiating text. Ukraine needs "ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty", and the leaders welcome the readiness of the United States to provide them[2]. No limitation may be placed on the Ukrainian armed forces or on their cooperation with third countries[2]. Russia has no veto over the path of Ukraine towards the Union and NATO[2]. Decisions on territory belong to Ukraine, and borders may not be changed by force[2]. The leaders pledge to strengthen sanctions while the killing continues and declare that the Coalition of the Willing is ready to play an active role[2].

The statement also records a concession. The leaders say they are ready to work with President Trump and President Zelensky towards a trilateral summit[2]. The trilateral format contains three parties. Europe is not one of them. President Macron said as much in Washington two days later, when he suggested a quadrilateral meeting as a follow-up[4]. The gap between the two formats is the subject of this Commentary.

A second shift happened between Anchorage and Washington. Before the summit, Ukraine and its European partners had asked for a ceasefire first. After it, President Trump wrote that he wanted to "go directly to a Peace Agreement"[3]. The European leaders in Washington urged him to reconsider and to keep pressing for a ceasefire[5]. Chancellor Merz said in the Oval Office that he could not imagine the next meeting taking place without a ceasefire[4]. The President did not change his position. The sequence that Europe wanted, with a ceasefire before any discussion of territory, has given way to the sequence that Moscow prefers.

What Washington gave and what it did not

The 18 August meeting brought Chancellor Merz, President Macron, Prime Minister Starmer, Prime Minister Meloni, President Stubb, President von der Leyen and Secretary General Rutte to the White House with President Zelensky[4]. Three results can be recorded. First, President Trump said the United States would join Europe in providing security guarantees as part of a broader peace deal, with the words "there's going to be a lot of help"[4]. Second, he said Europe would be the first line of defence and did not rule out American troops[5]. Third, he interrupted the meeting to telephone President Putin and then posted that he had begun the arrangements for a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, to be followed by a summit including himself[5].

The limits are as clear as the results. Russia did not confirm a meeting with President Zelensky and said only that the two presidents had discussed raising the level of representation in the negotiations[5]. The Russian Foreign Ministry said it "categorically" rejects a military contingent with NATO country participation inside Ukraine[5]. President Trump's guarantee has no text and no date. Secretary General Rutte called the American stance a breakthrough[4]. We would call it an opening.

The European Union holds instruments that neither Anchorage nor Washington touched. On 18 July the Council adopted the eighteenth sanctions package, which lowers the oil price cap from USD 60 to USD 47.6 from 3 September, lists 105 further shadow fleet vessels for a total of 447 and imposes a full transaction ban on 22 more Russian banks[6]. The package also prohibits any transaction involving Nord Stream 1 and 2[6]. Orysia Lutsevych notes that President Trump offered a delay on secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil after Anchorage[3]. The Union's sanctions therefore remain the one instrument of pressure that is not being delayed. That instrument belongs to the Council, acting by unanimity, and to no one else.

Europe was invited to Washington. For our generation the question is whether Europe arrives at the next meeting with something of its own to sign. The 16 August statement contains positions. It does not contain commitments that Moscow or Washington can price. We propose four.

First, the Coalition of the Willing should publish, before any Putin-Zelensky meeting, the size, the command structure and the rules of engagement of the force it would deploy in Ukraine after a ceasefire. The guarantee would then become a document. Second, the Council should adopt a decision now that ties any easing of sanctions to a verified ceasefire and to the return of deported Ukrainian children, so that the sanctions become a negotiating asset held by Europe. Third, the Member States that attended Washington should ask the European Council to mandate President Costa and President von der Leyen to sit in any trilateral meeting on behalf of the Union. That mandate would turn President Macron's quadrilateral into a formal request. Fourth, the Union should state in writing that the accession path of Ukraine is governed by Article 49 TEU and by nothing agreed in a third country. The sentence about Russia's veto in the 16 August statement would then acquire legal weight.