After Nord Stream: who guards the pipes and cables under European seas

Seismic stations in Sweden and Denmark recorded two events near Bornholm on Monday 26 September, at 02:03 and at 19:03[1]. Denmark and Sweden told the United Nations Security Council today that at least two detonations occurred underwater and that the explosive load was probably "several hundred kilos"[6]. The institutes measured the events at magnitudes 2.3 and 2.1[6]. Four leaks followed, on Nord Stream 2 in the Danish exclusive economic zone and on both lines of Nord Stream 1 in the Danish and Swedish zones[2][5]. The gas rose to the surface in a disturbance more than one kilometre wide[2]. We examine what the Union has said, what the attack reveals about protection at sea and what should change before winter.

Sabotage by every official account

Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said on 27 September that the authorities' clear assessment was that these were deliberate actions, and that it "was not an accident"[2]. The High Representative Josep Borrell said on 28 September on behalf of the 27 Member States that "all available information indicates those leaks are the result of a deliberate act"[2]. President von der Leyen wrote after a call with Ms Frederiksen that any deliberate disruption would lead to "the strongest possible response"[2]. The North Atlantic Council said on 29 September that the available information pointed to "deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage" and that any deliberate attack on Allies' critical infrastructure would meet a united and determined response[4]. The Kremlin's spokesman called the accusation against Russia "predictably stupid and absurd"[2]. No government has attributed the attack. Danish authorities say that inspecting the holes may take one to two weeks[2].

The attack did not cut any supply. Russia had already stopped Nord Stream 1 on 31 August, and Nord Stream 2 never entered service[5]. Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson said that there was no immediate effect on the Union's energy supply[2]. The damage is to the climate and to the sea. A Nord Stream 2 spokesperson said that the system held 300 million cubic metres of gas[3]. Paul Balcombe of Queen Mary University of London estimates that a full release from Nord Stream 2 alone would amount to about 200,000 tonnes of methane, equal in warming effect to about 6 million tonnes of carbon dioxide[3]. The Nord Stream 1 leaks are expected to run until 2 October[6].

The lesson is in the choice of target. Someone destroyed pipelines that carried no gas, in international waters, in the exclusive economic zones of two European states, one of them a NATO ally and the other an applicant. The act tells every European government that the same can be done to a pipe that matters. Norway, now Europe's largest gas supplier, has strengthened security at its onshore and offshore installations, and its Petroleum Safety Authority has warned of unidentified drones near platforms[7]. Denmark's gas operator Energinet says the country will raise security across its energy sector[7].

The gap in protection at sea

The Union has no instrument for this. Protection of energy infrastructure rests with the Member States[5]. The relevant Union law is the Directive on European critical infrastructure of 2008, which set a framework to identify and protect installations; an update before the co-legislators would require Member States to carry out risk assessments every four years[5]. A risk assessment every four years does not stop a charge placed by a diver. Julian Pawlak of the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies says that it is "basically difficult to monitor all of your sea cables or all of your pipelines", and that neither Europe nor NATO can station a warship every ten nautical miles[5]. The Estonian MEP Urmas Paet says that Europe must be "on a very high alert level everywhere"[5].

The timing compounds the exposure. The Union imported 58 per cent of its energy in 2020[5]. It has replaced Russian pipeline gas with pipeline gas from Norway, Azerbaijan and Algeria and with liquefied natural gas from the United States, Norway and Algeria[5]. Each route ends in a pipe or a terminal at the coast. The Council agreed on 26 July to cut gas demand by 15 per cent this winter[8], and it agreed today on emergency measures that cap the market revenues of inframarginal generators at 180 euro per megawatt-hour and require a 5 per cent cut in electricity demand at peak hours[9]. Those measures manage scarcity; they do not protect the assets.

The Baltic is the test case. It is a shallow sea, crossed by pipelines and cables, bordered by eight Member States and by Russia. The two states whose zones were attacked are coordinating with NATO allies on next steps and on infrastructure protection[5]. Denmark's defence minister Morten Bødskov said that there was no cause for security concern in the region and that he expected Russia "to continue their sabre-rattling"[7]. That calm suits the public and fails as a planning assumption.

What should change before winter

Our generation will depend on undersea infrastructure for the whole of its working life, for gas this winter, for offshore wind in the next decade and for data every day. The response should match the precedent that 26 September sets.

We recommend that the Council adopt the Directive on the resilience of critical entities before the end of 2022 and that it list subsea pipelines, interconnectors and cables expressly among the assets for which Member States must designate critical entities.

We recommend that the Member States bordering the Baltic and the North Sea create, under a NATO framework and with Union funding, a shared maritime surveillance picture of their pipelines and cables, with patrols assigned to the landing points and the shallow crossings where a charge can be placed from a small vessel.

We recommend that the Commission propose a stress test of energy infrastructure, on the model of the nuclear stress tests of 2011, covering the physical protection of every import pipeline, LNG terminal and interconnector, with results reported to the European Council by the spring.

We recommend that the Union and its Member States fund an independent measurement of the methane released from the four leaks and publish the figure, so that the climate cost of the attack is recorded and not estimated.